What active labour market programmes work for immigrants in Europe? : a meta-analysis of the evaluation literature by Butschek, Sebastian & Walter, Thomas
Dis cus si on Paper No. 13-056
What Active Labour Market Programmes 
Work for Immigrants in Europe? 
A Meta-Analysis of the Evaluation Literature
Sebastian Butschek and Thomas Walter
Dis cus si on Paper No. 13-056
What Active Labour Market Programmes 
Work for Immigrants in Europe? 
A Meta-Analysis of the Evaluation Literature
Sebastian Butschek and Thomas Walter
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13056.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Non-technical summary 
Immigrants are a disadvantaged group on European labour markets. In most countries, they 
are over-represented in unemployment and under-represented in employment. To integrate 
immigrants into the labour market, European governments use a broad range of Active 
Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) including language and introduction courses, job 
search assistance, training programmes, and subsidised public and private sector employment. 
A growing number of empirical evaluation studies investigate the employment effects of 
ALMPs on immigrants. Yet, there is no clear picture which programmes work for immigrants 
and which do not. In order to help policymakers allocate resources efficiently we condense 
the findings of the existing studies by means of a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis identifies the 
extent to which certain features of the underlying studies (e.g., programmes analysed, 
methods employed, data used) predict the results of these studies. We focus on the 
relationship between the type of programme evaluated and the programme’s estimated 
employment effect on immigrants. 
We find that only wage subsidies in the private sector can be confidently recommended to 
European policy-makers. In most evaluation studies, wage subsidies are estimated to increase 
employment chances of immigrants. On the other hand, most studies present insignificant 
estimates for the effect of training. The same is true for job-search assistance and public-
sector employment. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In vielen europäischen Ländern sind Immigranten eine benachteiligte Gruppe auf dem 
Arbeitsmarkt. Sie sind häufig in Arbeitslosigkeit überrepräsentiert und in Beschäftigung 
unterrepräsentiert. Um die Beschäftigungschancen von Immigranten zu erhöhen, setzen 
europäische Regierungen auf vielfältige Maßnahmen der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Diese 
beinhalten Sprach- und Integrationskurse, Unterstützungsmaßnahmen bei der Jobsuche, 
Trainingsmaßnahmen sowie subventionierte Beschäftigung im öffentlichen und privaten 
Sektor. 
Eine wachsende Anzahl an empirischen Evaluationsstudien untersucht die 
Beschäftigungseffekte dieser arbeitsmarktpolitischen Maßnahmen für Immigranten. Bisher 
ergibt sich daraus allerdings noch kein klares Bild, welche Maßnahmen für die 
Arbeitsmarktintegration von Immigranten förderlich sind und welche nicht. Um den 
politischen Entscheidungsträgern zu helfen, die Maßnahmen effizient einzusetzen, verdichten 
wir die Ergebnisse der vorhandenen Studien durch eine Meta-Analyse. Eine Meta-Analyse 
ermöglicht es zu identifizieren, in welchem Maße bestimmte Elemente der zugrunde 
liegenden Studien (z. B. die untersuchten Maßnahmen, die verwendeten Methoden und 
Daten) Einfluss auf die Ergebnisse haben, zu denen diese Studien gelangen. In unserer 
Analyse sind wir am Einfluss des untersuchten Maßnahmentyps auf die 
Beschäftigungschancen der teilnehmenden Immigranten interessiert. 
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur der Einsatz von Lohnsubventionen im privaten Sektor als 
beschäftigungswirksam für Immigranten eingestuft werden kann. Die meisten 
Evaluationsstudien ermitteln für Lohnsubventionen positive Beschäftigungseffekte. 
Evaluationen von Trainingsmaßnahmen finden hingegen überwiegend insignifikante Effekte. 
Dasselbe gilt für Unterstützungsmaßnahmen bei der Jobsuche und subventionierte 
Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Sektor.  
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A growing body of programme evaluation literature recognises immigrants as a disadvantaged group 
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1  Introduction 
Immigrants are under-represented in employment and over-represented in unemployment in 
most European countries. In 2009/2010 their employment rate was on average 2.9 percentage 
points lower than that of natives across all European OECD countries. At the same time their 
unemployment rate was 4.3 percentage points higher (see OECD, 2012).  
To facilitate immigrants’ labour market integration, European governments use a wide range 
of Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs). These include language and introduction 
courses, job search assistance, training programmes, and subsidised public and private sector 
employment and involve substantial government spending. While evidence on the effective-
ness of single programmes exists, it has not been reviewed systematically to establish empiri-
cally which types of programmes actually facilitate immigrants’ employment uptake. To shed 
light on this question we review the small but growing literature evaluating the employment 
effects of ALMPs on immigrants in Europe. By means of a meta-analysis, we try to identify 
which ALMPs work for immigrants and which ones do not. Our results should help policy-
makers employ activation measures more efficiently. 
With respect to ALMPs’ effects on all unemployed workers (natives and immigrants), recent 
analyses have strengthened a growing consensus: job search assistance and, to some extent, 
wage subsidies are effective in the short run while training works in the longer run; subsidised 
public sector employment (also known as public works), however, is generally ineffective 
(Heckman et al., 1999, Greenberg et al., 2003, Kluve, 2010, Card et al., 2010). Also, the find-
ings of the ALMP evaluation literature on heterogeneous treatment effects on women or 
young workers have been reviewed (e.g., Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008, Card et al., 
2010). 
For immigrants, only two surveys of the literature on the effect of ALMPs exist. Nekby 
(2008) provides a qualitative review of four studies evaluating labour market programmes for 
immigrants in the Nordic countries; she concludes that the same types of ALMPs work for 
immigrants as for the general population of unemployed workers. Rinne (2012) discusses the 
findings of three studies evaluating language/introduction courses designed for immigrants 
and eight recent evaluations of general labour market programmes’ effects on immigrants. In 
a similar vein as Nekby, he suggests that “programs that are relatively closely linked to the 
labor market (e.g., work experience and wage subsidies) appear as the comparatively most 
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effective programs” (Rinne, 2012, p 19). While both surveys present relevant evidence, nei-
ther of them formally aggregates the findings of the studies reviewed. 
We provide an accessible quantitative summary of the existing empirical evidence. To this 
end, we collect the relevant studies following a search protocol and then condense the find-
ings extracted from them in two steps: first, using descriptive analysis and second, performing 
a meta-analysis with sign and significance of the effect estimate as our outcome variable of 
interest. 
As Stanley (2001) argues, “The most important strength of meta-analysis is that it moves lit-
erature reviews away from casual judgments about “good” studies that deserve attention and 
“poor” studies that should be set aside, and instead provides a replicable statistical framework 
for summarizing and interpreting the full range of evidence.” The key ingredient of such an 
analysis is then an exhaustive data set of relevant studies. We find 33 micro-econometric pa-
pers that estimate 93 short-run treatment effects up to two years after programme start. The 
interventions evaluated were implemented in the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Den-
mark, and Finland), Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland between 1984 and 2007. 
Our descriptive analysis looks at the distribution of impact estimates conditional on study 
characteristics in order to provide an absolute indication of the effectiveness of different types 
of ALMPs. Performing a meta-analysis of the same sample of effect estimates allows us to go 
beyond the descriptive analysis in two ways. First, we can control for different study charac-
teristics when investigating which ALMP types are associated with significant or insignificant 
impact findings, simultaneously addressing such issues as methodological differences or 
changes in programme effectiveness over time. Second, we can provide a summary measure 
for whether the evidence suggests that one type of ALMP works better than some other. 
We find that subsidised employment in the private sector is significantly more likely estimat-
ed to have a positive effect on immigrants’ labour market outcomes than training. For the oth-
er ALMP types, our meta-analysis yields mostly insignificant results. The descriptive analysis 
shows that evaluations of training and job search assistance programmes produce predomi-
nantly insignificant effect estimates for immigrant participants. Public works seem to perform 
even worse, receiving many insignificant and negative evaluation results. Therefore, only 
subsidised employment in the private sector seems to be effective for immigrants. 
The remainder of this paper consists of four parts: section 2 provides background information 
on immigrants on European labour markets; section 3 describes the data and presents some 
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descriptive analysis; section 4 discusses the findings of our meta-analysis and performs a sen-
sitivity check; section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Immigrants in Europe and their labour market integration 
On average, the share of immigrants (defined as foreign-born persons) among the total popu-
lation amounted to 11.2% in European OECD countries in 2009/2010 (see Table A.1 in the 
appendix). 1 In almost every country, the share of immigrants in the working age population 
(age 15 to 64) is even larger than in the total population. It amounts to 13.3% on average 
across European OECD countries.  
Despite substantial heterogeneity in immigrant origins, European countries share the problem 
of integrating immigrants into the labour market. Immigrants are usually under-represented in 
employment and over-represented in unemployment. Table 1 shows the employment and un-
employment rates of immigrants in our sample of seven European OECD countries in 
2009/2010 and how they compare to the respective rates of the native populations. On aver-
age, the employment rate for immigrants in these countries is 65.8%. It is 9.3 percentage 
points lower than the rate for natives. Differences in the employment rate are especially pro-
nounced in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, with a difference of more than 10 per-
centage points. Correspondingly, unemployment is more prevalent among immigrants than 
among natives. Immigrants’ unemployment rate is 11.6% on average. It is more than twice as 
high as the natives’ unemployment rate (5.4%). Across all European OECD countries, differ-
ences in the employment and unemployment rates between immigrants and natives are small-
er than in the seven countries investigated here but still sizeable: 4.3 percentage points for 
unemployment and 2.9 percentage points for employment. 
 
Include Table 1 about here 
 
To combat the high level of unemployment among immigrants and to foster their employment 
uptake governments use Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs). For immigrants, two 
different categories of ALMPs can be distinguished: first, programmes that are specifically 
                                              
1
 Note that this figure includes only the first generation of immigrants. Unfortunately, comparable data on immi-
grants across European countries including the second or third generation are not available. 
4 
 
designed for and exclusively targeted at immigrants, and second, general programmes that are 
also used for the native population. In what follows we will refer to these categories as mi-
grant-specific and general ALMPs, respectively. 
General ALMPs comprise four types of interventions (see, e.g., Card et al., 2010): 
1) Training: This includes all programmes that aim to enhance participants’ skills 
needed for employment uptake (e.g. computer courses or courses providing 
specific occupational knowledge). Training programmes can be provided ei-
ther on-the-job within a firm or off-the-job in a classroom. 
2) Subsidised private sector employment: This category comprises programmes 
that generate incentives to increase job opportunities in the private sector. One 
example for such a programme is wage subsidies for employers who hire dis-
advantaged workers. Wage subsidies can also be paid to workers when they 
accept a job with a wage below their unemployment benefits or when they 
start their own business. 
3) Subsidised public sector employment (public works): This type of intervention 
aims at offering temporary job opportunities outside the private sector, mainly 
for community services. Public-works programmes should be designed in such 
a way that they do not crowd out regular employment.  
4) Job search assistance and sanctions: This intervention type has the objective 
of making the job search process of participants more effective and efficient. 
Job search assistance is predominantly provided by public employment ser-
vices and includes counselling and monitoring of job search efforts. In case of 
a lack of job search effort, sanctions are intended to restore an appropriate lev-
el of compliance. 
Migrant-specific programmes can be grouped into three categories: 
1) Language training often not only improves participants’ ability to communi-
cate in the host country’s main language but also provides information about 
history, culture and institutions of the host country. One example for such a 
course is the so-called orientation course in Germany (see, e.g., Liebig, 2007) 
2) Introduction programmes provide a customised integration plan towards em-
ployment uptake. Targeted at newly arriving immigrants, they usually start 
with language training and continue with either training or subsidised em-
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ployment. Throughout the programme job search assistance is provided. See, 
e.g., Andersson Joona and Nekby (2012) and Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen 
(2012) for introduction programmes in Sweden and Finland, respectively. 
3) General programmes exclusively for immigrants comprise general ALMPs 
other than language courses (training, subsidised private or public sector em-
ployment, job search assistance and sanctions) targeted at immigrants (and not 
at natives). One example for such an intervention is intensified job search as-
sistance programmes, where immigrants are assigned to caseworkers whose 
caseload is reduced. That is, caseworkers have more time for the counselling 
and support of each individual. See, e.g., Aslund and Johansson (2011) for a 
programme of this kind in Sweden. 
Whether general programmes or migrant-specific ones are more effective for the integration 
of immigrants in the labour market is a question of major policy interest. One might expect 
migrant-specific programmes to be more successful since they are designed for the needs of 
immigrants whereas general programmes address the needs of average participants, including 
mostly natives. However, the fact that in practice both programmes coexist in all European 
countries might be taken to suggest that neither of them is superior or that policymakers are 
not aware of which programmes work and which ones do not.
 2
 Empirical studies have not 
established an answer to this question either. We attempt to address it by means of our meta-
analysis (see section 3). 
 
3  Description of the Data 
3.1 Estimation Sample 
To obtain an exhaustive sample of studies evaluating the effects of ALMPs on immigrants’ 
labour market outcomes, we implemented the following search protocol: 
1) Collect studies on ALMPs surveyed by Nekby (2008), Rinne (2012), Kluve 
(2010), and Card et al. (2010). 
                                              
2
 If the migrant-specific programmes were successful in integrating all newly-arriving immigrants into the labour 
market and into stable jobs, there would not be any need for participation in general ALMPs later on. 
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2) Perform internet keyword searches3 on 27 November 2012 and on 15 April 
2013 to find additional studies. 
We then identified those studies that met the following selection criteria: 
1) Studies that estimate ALMP treatment effects for immigrants.4  
2) Studies that perform a micro-econometric evaluation of the intervention’s ef-
fect on individual labour market outcomes, outlining the identification strate-
gy. 
3) Studies that evaluate an intervention that roughly fits into one of four ALMP 
categories (described more fully below): training, wage subsidy, public works, 
or services/sanctions. We also admitted studies that evaluate the aggregate ef-
fect of a country’s ALMPs. 
Applying these criteria yielded a sample of 34 studies estimating ALMP effects on immi-
grants’ probability of or hazard to employment5 in seven countries (Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland). Some studies evaluate several pro-
grammes or perform their analyses separately by gender or region as well as estimating ef-
fects for different points in time during follow-up. For comparability, we focus on short-run 
estimates, defined as effect estimates based on outcomes observed up to two years after pro-
gramme start
6
. Where there is more than one such short-term estimate per gender-region-
group combination, we choose the latest (most long-term) one. This gives 33 studies provid-
ing 93 short-run estimates.
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The four ALMP categories we use are as follows: 
                                              
3
 Keywords, in different combinations: ALMP, labour market programmes, labor market programs, migrants, 
foreign, native, born, citizen, subgroup, sub-group, hetero; search engines used: Google Scholar, EconPapers and 
Econis. 
4
 The definition of immigrants varies across studies. It usually means those with foreign citizenship, the foreign-
born or individuals whose parents or grandparents were foreign-born. Most studies estimate heterogeneous 
ALMP treatment effects for several subgroups, including immigrants. A few studies have a sample of only im-
migrants. 
5
 Instead of looking at employment, one study considers earnings. Another, evaluating the promotion of self-
employment, uses yet a different outcome variable: neither unemployed nor in receipt of unemployment. 
6
 While we do have information on longer-run outcomes (38 estimates), there is not enough variation in them to 
permit a separate econometric analysis. One study reports only long-term estimates for 36 and 50 months after 
the programme (Groß et al., 2006). This study is dropped from the analysis. 
7
 See the references for the list of the 33 studies analysed. 
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1) Classroom and on-the-job training (henceforth “training”) 
2) Subsidised private sector employment (“wage subsidy”) 
3) Subsidised public sector employment (“public works”) 
4) Job-search assistance and sanctions (“services/sanctions”) 
These are taken from Card et al. (2010) but are fairly standard in the evaluation literature, as 
exemplified by analogous definitions in Calmfors (1994) and Kluve (2010). We allow for a 
fifth residual group of “other programmes” (including aggregate ALMP effects and pro-
grammes that combine several ALMP types in a single treatment). See also section 2 for a 
definition of the ALMP categories.
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From our sample of 33 studies we extracted information about the programme evaluated and 
its geographic and chronological setting, the sample studied and the methods applied. We 
recorded programme type, duration and whether it was designed specifically for immigrants 
in order to characterise the nature of the treatment. To capture sample characteristics, we in-
cluded information on whether an effect was estimated for males, females or a mixed group of 
participants as well as in what country and decade they received the treatment. As methodo-
logical proxies we documented the econometric technique used and whether the estimates 




3.2 Summary Statistics 
The first column of Table 2 summarises the distribution of the short-run estimates we focus 
on. First, consider the outcome variable: those evaluations finding no effect are most frequent 
(48 estimates), followed by ones finding significantly positive effects (32), with significantly 
negative effect estimates less frequent still (13 estimates). 
 
Include Table 2 about here 
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 Since only 6 out of the 33 studies analyse migrant-specific programmes, our econometric analysis cannot dif-
ferentiate between these types of ALMP as outlined in section 2. Instead we define a dummy variable to indicate 
whether a programme is migrant-specific or general. We then classify migrant-specific programmes as training, 
wage subsidy, public works, services/sanctions or other programme, depending on their content. 
9
 We categorised PhD dissertations as published studies because of the similarities between PhD supervision and 
the referee process. 
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Next, lines 2a) to 2e) show that among ALMP types, training programmes dominate (30 esti-
mates). Public works also feature prominently, contributing 23 data points; the third column 
reveals that this pattern is driven by evaluations for Germany. Both wage-subsidy (16) and 
services/sanctions (17) each provide about half as many observations as the largest category. 
There are seven estimates in the residual category (other programmes). Only six of our 93 
estimates are for migrant-specific programmes, whereas 87 are for general ones (see lines 2f) 
and 2g), respectively). 
Lines 3a) through 3c) show that 25 estimates are for programmes with a duration of up to four 
months, while 20 effects are estimated for programmes of at least five months. However, 
most short-run estimates are for programmes of unknown or mixed duration (48), reflecting 
some heterogeneity in the level of detail on interventions given in the papers. Lines 4a) 
through 4c) reveal that about two thirds of estimates are from the 2000s. Next, lines 5a) 
through 5c) illustrate that matching approaches were the most popular method (55 estimates). 
From column 3 it is clear that German estimates, based on matching procedures with only one 
exception, account for this distribution. Finally, lines 6a) and 6b) demonstrate that less than a 
third of the short-run estimates came from published papers (28), with Nordic evaluations 
accounting for disproportionately many publications (20)
10
. 
Comparing estimates by origin reveals that the largest contributor, Germany, differs markedly 
from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Nordic countries) and Switzerland and the 
Netherlands (other countries). Nordic estimates are relatively optimistic about programme 
effects while most German estimates are insignificant and effects tend to be more often nega-
tive in the other countries. There is more variety in the methods used to evaluate Nordic and 
Swiss/Dutch programmes than for German programmes. While training is the  ALMP type 
evaluated most frequently in the Nordic countries and Switzerland/Netherlands, evaluations 
of public works dominate in Germany. 
 
                                              
10
 We do not intend to suggest that published papers meet different quality standards than working papers, given 
that we are agnostic about the relative quality of the various refereed journals and opt for estimates from working 
papers in some cases where the published version no longer presents all heterogeneous effect estimates, e.g., 
Gerfin and Lechner (2000). 
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3.3 Descriptive Analysis 
In this subsection we present the distribution of the outcome variable (short-run effect: signif-
icantly negative, insignificant or significantly positive) conditional on the covariates we ex-
tracted from the studies (see Table 3). This serves a dual purpose: one is to provide a flavour 
of the potential results of the meta-analysis; another is to give some absolute indications of 
the effectiveness of the programme types evaluated. This is important because our meta-
analysis, by virtue of its method, only allows conclusions about the relative effectiveness of 
different types of programme. 
 
Include Table 3 about here 
 
Lines 1a) to 1e) of Table 3 show that insignificant estimates are the largest category in all 
types of ALMP except for wage subsidies, where 10 out of 16 estimates are positive. For 
training and services/sanctions, about half of the estimates are insignificant while for public 
works, about two thirds are insignificant. For both training and services/sanctions, positive 
estimates are more frequent than negative ones, while the converse is true for public works. 
These raw descriptive statistics indicate that wage subsidies seem to have positive employ-
ment effects; for the remaining ALMP categories, the evidence mostly points to an employ-
ment effect too close to zero to be significant. Because only six of the 93 estimates are for 
migrant-specific programmes (see lines 1f) and 1g), respectively), it is hard to draw reliable 
conclusions about their relative effectiveness. We effectively focus on the effect of general 
ALMPs on immigrants. 
The next three lines, 2a) to 2c), seem to suggest that duration analysis is more optimistic 
about programme effectiveness than matching approaches are. Similarly, lines 3a) to 3c) may 
point to a deterioration of ALMP quality over time from the 1980s to the 2000s. While pro-
gramme duration is unknown in most cases, short programmes may have been more effective 
than longer ones. Finally, published papers seem to find positive effects in a higher fraction of 
cases. Yet, regional and chronological differences may be confounding all of these potential 




4  Empirical Analysis  
4.1 Method 
We perform an ordered probit analysis with sign and significance of the estimate as the out-
come variable. This variable can take three values: significantly negative, insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero, and significantly positive. The explanatory variables of interest are dummies 
describing the type of ALMP. In addition, we include a number of variables to account for 
differences in evaluation technique and setting. We focus on the relationship between ALMP 
type and sign/significance of the short-run effect estimated for each study-gender-region cell. 
The index model underlying our estimation is as follows: 
 
where , , and  are dummy variables describing the programme type analysed in 
study (wage subsidy, public works, services/sanctions, or other programmes, with training 
being the omitted category),  is a vector of control variables (study characteristics, pro-
gramme characteristics, sample characteristics, contextual controls) and  is an error term. 
Taking into account the degrees of freedom underlying each effect estimate as well as a 
measure of effect size (such as a t-statistic) would be an attractive alternative to the 
sign/significance approach we take (see, e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003 and Stanley, 2005). It 
would allow us to identify systematic differences in estimated effect size across types of pro-
gramme, unconfounded by differences in precision. However, the plurality of the underlying 
econometric estimation techniques makes this unfeasible.
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Card et al. (2010) show that the approach we follow would be invalid if the pattern of esti-
mate sign and significance were generated by differences in precision rather than differences 
in effect size. They also demonstrate that the sign/significance approach is approximately val-
id when the effective sample size is constant, i.e., when larger samples are offset by more 
demanding designs. They present evidence that this is the case in their sample of studies and 
indeed find that the sign/significance approach and an effect size-based analysis on a subsam-
ple of studies that use the probability of employment as outcome variable yield similar results. 
                                              
11
It is not straightforward how test statistics from different types of models can be transformed into a common 
distribution so that the test statistics can be compared directly. For instance, test statistics from a duration model 
and a matching model will have different distributions (and degrees of freedom). 
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While we cannot perform such a check for our smaller set of studies, we can partly rely on 
their finding in that there is some overlap between our samples of evaluation studies. 
Recent theoretical work on meta-analyses has stressed the importance of checking for publi-
cation bias (see, e.g., Stanley, 2005). We cannot rule out publication bias as the test statistics 
of the studies we analyse are not directly comparable. In this paper, however, our focus is the 
relative effectiveness of different types of ALMPs. As long as the presence of publication bias 
does not interact with the type of programme evaluated, it will not distort our findings on the 
relative effectiveness of different types of ALMPs. 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
We estimate six specifications of the ordered probit model outlined above, gradually introduc-
ing groups of control variables. Specification 1 includes only the type of programme, omitting 
training. Specification 2 adds study characteristics: whether the study employed duration 
analysis or some other econometric technique (omitted: matching), and whether the paper is 
published (baseline: working paper). Specification 3 introduces programme characteristics, 
namely whether the intervention was designed for immigrants and whether the treatment was 
short, that is, no longer than four months. In specification 4, sample characteristics enter the 
equation: participant gender (baseline: pooled estimation for men and women) and treatment 
in the 2000s (omitted: 1980s or 1990s). Specification 5 adds the unemployment rate in the 
year that the evaluated programme started as a proxy for the macroeconomic context. Alterna-
tively, specification 6 uses GDP growth as a contextual control.
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Table 4 presents the results. In specification 1, which includes only programme type, we ob-
tain positive coefficients for wage subsidy and services/sanctions. The interpretation for these 
positive coefficients is that studies evaluating wage subsidies and services/sanctions are more 
likely to find positive employment effects than studies evaluating training. However, the es-
timated coefficients are not statistically significant. The coefficients on public works and oth-
er programmes are negative, though only the coefficient for other programmes is marginally 
significant. There is no meaningful interpretation for the coefficient on “other programmes” 
as this is a residual category. 
                                              
12
 Unemployment rates and GDP growth rates were obtained from the Online OECD Employment database; see 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/employmentpoliciesanddata/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm (accessed on 
7 January, 2013). 
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When including study characteristics (method and publication status) in specification 2, the 
results remain very similar. None of the ALMP types are significant except for the residual 
category. Specification 3’s programme features cause the wage subsidy coefficient to grow 
and become significant; all other ALMP type coefficients remain insignificant. Including in-
formation about the sample on the right-hand side in specification 4 does little to wage subsi-
dy (still significant) and public works or services/sanctions (still insignificant). When we add 
contextual control variables in specification 5 (unemployment rate) and 6 (GDP growth rate), 
the coefficient on wage subsidy remains positive and significant, though only marginally in 
specification 6. The parameter estimates on public works and services/sanctions are still in-
significant.  
Based on the Akaike information criterion we choose specification 5 as our preferred one. 
Specification 5 contains the national unemployment rate at programme start as a contextual 
control variable. The coefficient on the unemployment rate is positive and significant, sug-
gesting that inferior macroeconomic conditions at the time of treatment are associated with a 
higher probability of a positive evaluation result.
13
  
Almost all other control variables in specification 5 (and across the other specifications) have 
insignificant coefficient estimates. Exceptions are the dummy for short programme (which is 
always marginally significant and positive) and the dummy for published paper (which is pos-
itive and at least marginally significant in most specifications). The dummy for migrant-
specific programmes is insignificant. While this implies that these programmes are equally 
(in)effective as general ones, this result has to be interpreted with caution as the number of 
studies analysing migrant-specific programmes is small.  
 
Include Table 4 about here 
 
It is worth re-iterating that our ordered probit analysis only permits relative, not absolute, 
conclusions on the effectiveness of ALMP types. Thus, our meta-analysis suggests that wage 
subsidies work better than training. Because the corresponding coefficients are insignificant, 
we cannot claim with confidence that public works are less effective than training or that ser-
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 This result is in line with the findings of Lechner and Wunsch (2009), who show a positive correlation of the 
unemployment rate at the start of the programme with the effectiveness of training programmes in Germany. 
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vices/sanctions are more effective even though coefficients signs consistently point in that 
direction. 
Combining our conclusions from the meta-analysis with the descriptive analysis in section 3 
suggests that wage subsidies not only work better than other programmes but also do have 
positive employment effects on immigrants. The descriptive results appear most pessimistic 
about public works, as do the meta-analytic results (albeit insignificant), suggesting at the 
least that this type of programme should be used very selectively. Insignificant programme 
estimates dominate the descriptive analysis of training and job search assistance. No firm 
conclusions can be drawn on the suitability of these activation measures for immigrants in the 
short-run. Additional research on the longer-run employment effects may help clarify the pic-
ture. 
Our findings are based on a smaller sample of studies and on a more specific group of pro-
gramme participants than the meta-analyses of Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010) but point 
in a similar direction. Moreover, they are in line with the conclusions that Nekby (2008) and 
Rinne (2012) arrived at in their qualitative reviews. 
 
4.3 Robustness analysis 
To address the potential criticism that our selection criteria were to some extent arbitrary we 
vary these criteria and re-estimate our preferred specification on the sample of estimates this 
gives. This provides a simple check on the robustness of our results. Our variation is to tight-
en the definitions of ALMPs and of the short run. 
First, we drop estimates for programmes that, strictly speaking, are not ALMPs. That is, we 
exclude evaluation studies of temporary agency work, which like wage subsidy programmes 
make hiring cheaper and may facilitate employer-worker matching, and exclude transfer re-
duction programmes, which work much like sanctions. Moreover, we exclude evaluations of 
aggregate ALMP effects. Second, we define the short run as up to twelve months after pro-
gramme start rather than 24 months.  
This gives an alternative sample of 86 estimates from 27 studies. As Table 5 illustrates, our 
variation results in a very similar pattern of coefficient estimates, providing evidence for the 
robustness of our findings (see Table A.2 in the appendix for the full results). In the appendix 
we also include the results of both main and robustness analysis when standard errors are 
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clustered at the study level
14
. As Tables A.3 and A.4 illustrate, these are practically the same 
as those presented here. 
 
Include Table 5 about here 
 
5 Conclusion 
Immigrants constitute an important group on European labour markets in terms of both the 
risks they face and the potential they harbour: they are numerous and over-represented in un-
employment on the one hand but younger than the native population on the other. This high-
lights the importance of immigrants’ labour market integration. While the full range of 
ALMPs is used in practice, there is little empirical guidance for policy-makers seeking to fa-
cilitate immigrants’ employment take-up. In other words, there is not yet a clear indication of 
what programmes work for immigrants. 
To answer this question, we provide a quantitative synthesis of the evidence on ALMPs’ ef-
fect on immigrants. Using 93 effect estimates extracted from 33 relevant evaluation studies, 
we perform a meta-analysis of the evaluation results. An ordered probit analysis based on sign 
and significance of short-run effect estimates suggests that wage subsidies work better for 
immigrants than training programmes. Public works may be less effective while job search 
assistance programmes (services/sanctions) may be more effective but estimated coefficients 
are insignificant. To help interpret these relative statements, we present a detailed descriptive 
analysis: there, effect estimates for wage subsidy programmes are mostly positive, suggesting 
that wage subsidies are indeed a promising measure to increase employment rates of immi-
grants. They should be used more often than public works which reduce employment chances 
or result in insignificant employment effects at best. The short-run effects of ser-
vices/sanctions on employment prospects are mostly insignificant. The same is true for train-
ing. 
At this point, only wage subsidies can be confidently recommended to policymakers trying 
using general ALMPs to improve immigrants’ labour market integration. The reasons for the 
                                              
14
 Several studies present estimates for the effects of multiple programmes. These estimates are based on differ-
ent samples of people though. This is why we regard the estimates as independent. It may be argued that author’s 
individual research strategies introduce correlation between multiple estimates of one study – in which case 
clustering at the study level would be appropriate. 
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disappointing effects of the other programmes need to be clarified in further research. Fur-
thermore, migrant-specific interventions such as language courses and introduction pro-
grammes, on which the evidence is still scarce, may be promising; further research in this area 
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Table 1: Employment and unemployment rates of immigrants in selected European 
OECD countries, 2009/2010 
Country Employment 
rate of foreign-










Denmark 65.6 -10.0 11.8 5.5 
Finland 62.1 -6.6 16.3 8.2 
Germany 63.8 -8.7 12.2 5.6 
Netherlands 65.5 -11.9 7.7 4.2 
Norway 66.6 -9.8 9.9 7.0 
Sweden 61.7 -12.9 15.8 8.7 
Switzerland 75.1 -5.1 7.4 4.2 
7-country average 
(unweighted) 65.8 -9.3 11.6 6.2 
European OECD aver-
age (unweighted) 63.2 -2.9 12.6 4.3 
Source: OECD (2012) and own calculations 














1) Estimated programme effect 
a) Negative 13 4 1 8 
b) Insignificant 48 13 30 5 
c) Positive 32 17 12 3 
2) ALMP type 
a) Training 30 9 13 8 
b) Wage subsidy 16 9 3 4 
c) Public works 23 5 15 3 
d) Services/Sanctions 17 6 10 1 
e) Other programmes 7 5 2 0 
f) Migrant-specific programme 6 5 0 1 
g) General programme 87 29 43 15 
3) Programme duration 
a) Up to 4 months 25 3 18 4 
b) 5 or more months 20 1 15 4 
c) Mixed/unknown 48 30 10 8 
4) Time evaluated programme ran 
a) 1980s 2 2 0 0 
b) 1990s 31 15 0 16 
c) 2000s 60 17 43 0 
5) Method employed 
a) Matching 55 4 42 9 
b) Duration 29 22 0 7 
c) Other method 9 8 1 0 
6) Publication status 
a) Working paper 65 14 37 14 
b) Published 28 20 6 2 
Number of estimates 93 34 43 16 
Remarks: The table displays absolute numbers. Short-run estimates are defined as effect estimates 
based on outcomes observed up to two years after programme start. Where there are more than one 
such short-term estimates, the latest (most long-term) one is sampled. Nordic countries include 




Table 3: Distribution of the estimated programme effects in the estimation sample 






1) ALMP type 
a) Training 5 14 11 
b) Wage subsidy 2 4 10 
c) Public works 5 15 3 
d) Services/Sanctions 0 9 8 
e) Other programmes 1 6 0 
f) Migrant-specific programme 0 4 2 
g) General programme 13 44 30 
2) Method employed 
a) Matching 4 38 13 
b) Duration 8 6 15 
c) Other method 1 4 4 
3) Time evaluated programme ran 
a) 1980s 0 0 2 
b) 1990s 9 11 11 
c) 2000s 4 37 19 
4) Programme duration 
a) Up to 4 months 2 10 13 
b) 5 or more months 5 14 1 
c) Mixed/unknown 6 24 18 
5) Publication status 
a) Working paper 11 35 19 
b) Published 2 13 13 
Number of estimates 13 48 32 
Remarks: The table displays absolute numbers. The numbers relate to short-run estimates which 
are defined as effect estimates based on outcomes observed up to two years after programme 
start. Where there are more than one such short-term estimates, the latest (most long-term) one 




Table 4: Estimation results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ALMP type (baseline: training)           
Wage subsidy 0.5732 0.6987 1.0664** 1.0561** 1.1301** 0.9855* 
  (0.4398) (0.4890) (0.5051) (0.5279) (0.5116) (0.5400) 
Public works -0.5024 -0.4879 -0.1016 -0.1287 -0.2983 -0.1835 
  (0.3170) (0.3158) (0.3279) (0.4567) (0.4579) (0.4574) 
Services/sanctions 0.5002 0.4474 0.342 0.2952 0.2386 0.2475 
  (0.3303) (0.3394) (0.3480) (0.3803) (0.4049) (0.3886) 
Other programmes -0.5985* -0.6727* -0.5925* -0.6039* -0.9004** -0.7541* 
  (0.3271) (0.3678) (0.3490) (0.3627) (0.3530) (0.4108) 
Study characteristics (baseline: matching, working 
paper) 




-0.1694 -0.1524 -0.1252 0.5544 -0.1132 
  
 
(0.3715) (0.3919) (0.4024) (0.4542) (0.4054) 
Other method 
 
-0.3006 0.0912 0.1477 0.2542 0.1718 
  
 
(0.4948) (0.5966) (0.5858) (0.5948) (0.5695) 
Published paper 
 
0.6123** 0.7224** 0.7099* 0.9968*** 0.6462* 
  
 
(0.2846) (0.2997) (0.3704) (0.3727) (0.3681) 
Programme characteristics (baseline: regular ALMP, duration unknown or greater than 




-0.0546 -0.0768 0.0452 -0.0954 
  
  
(0.5311) (0.5421) (0.5569) (0.5224) 
Short programme (up to 4 months) 
 
0.8051** 0.7990** 0.7728* 0.7464* 
  
  
(0.3314) (0.4036) (0.4246) (0.4143) 
Sample characteristics (baseline: pooled estimation for men and women, 1980s or 1990s pro-
gramme)  
Separate estimation for males 
  
0.2034 -0.0472 0.2282 
  
   
(0.4502) (0.4486) (0.4762) 
Separate estimation for females 
  
-0.258 -0.5787 -0.244 
  
   
(0.4641) (0.4812) (0.4784) 
2000s programme 
   
0.1314 -0.3203 0.1842 
  
   
(0.3374) (0.3653) (0.3358) 
Contextual controls  
   
  
Unemployment rate 
    
0.2167***   
  
    
(0.0790)   
GDP growth rate 
     
0.0615 
  
     
(0.1074) 
Number of observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0708 0.0925 0.1217 0.1344 0.1777 0.1364 
Akaike information crite-
rion 181.9881 184.0131 182.6708 186.3419 180.4334 187.9807 
The table displays estimated coefficients of ordered probit models. Heteroskedasticity-robust stand-
ard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable takes value 1 for significantly positive estimates, 0 
for insignificant and -1 for significantly negative estimates. Unemployment and GDP growth rates 
are annual rates in % for the year the evaluated programme started. "Other countries" includes Neth-




Table 5: Sensitivity analysis 
  Preferred Variation 
ALMP type (baseline: training) 
Wage subsidy 1.1301** 1.2955** 
  (0.5116) (0.6004) 
Public works -0.2983 -0.2629 
  (0.4579) (0.4553) 
Services/sanctions 0.2386 0.2203 
  (0.4049) (0.4010) 
Other programmes -0.9004** -1.0741** 
  (0.3530) (0.4343) 
Method yes yes 
Programme characteristics yes yes 
Sample characteristics yes yes 
Contextual controls UE UE 
Number of observations 93 86 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1777 0.1821 
Akaike information criterion 180.4334 171.6131 
The table displays the estimated coefficients of ordererd probit models. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. "Preferred" reproduces the results from column (5) in Ta-
ble 4. “Variation” tightens the definition of ALMP and the short run, eliminating 6 studies. 
"Other programmes" includes aggregate ALMP effects and combined programmes. UE is for 




































of the age 
group 15-64 
Denmark  414 7.5 341 9.5 3.3 33.5 1.3 7.4 54.4
Finland  233 4.4 197 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Germany 10 601 12.9 8271 15.1 3.3 15.6 1.3 1.6 78.2
Netherlands 1 833 11.1 1558 13.9 21.7 24.2 24.1 2.6 27.4
Norway  527 10.9 443 13.9 11.0 33.2 5.2 4.0 46.7
Sweden 1 338 14.4 1051 17.4 7.5 36.9 7.8 1.8 46.0
Switzerland 2 038 26.3 1649 31.3 5.8 8.2 6.1 2.8 77.1
7-country average 
(unweighted)
12.5 15.2 7.5 21.7 6.5 2.9 61.4
European OECD 
average (unweighted)
11.2 13.3 12.1 14.3 7.1 2.5 64.0
Source: OECD (2012) and own calculations
Foreign-born individuals Born in:
(% of all foreign-born 15-64)
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Table A.2: Sensitivity analysis, full results 
  Preferred Variation  
ALMP type (baseline: training) 
 
 
Wage subsidy 1.1301** 1.2955** 
  (0.5116) (0.6004) 
Public works -0.2983 -0.2629 
  (0.4579) (0.4553) 
Services/sanctions 0.2386 0.2203 
  (0.4049) (0.4010) 
Other programmes -0.9004** -1.0741** 
  (0.3530) (0.4343) 
Study characteristics (baseline: matching, working paper) 
 
  
Duration analysis 0.5544 0.5938 
  (0.4542) (0.4915) 
Other method 0.2542 0.405 
  (0.5948) (0.6215) 
Published paper 0.9968*** 0.8905** 
  (0.3727) (0.4184) 
Programme characteristics (baseline: regular ALMP, duration unknown or greater than 
four months) 
Migrant-specific programme 0.0452 0.1917 
  (0.5569) (0.5594) 
Short programme (up to 4 months) 0.7728* 0.7713* 
  (0.4246) (0.4210) 
Sample characteristics (baseline: pooled estimation for men and women, 1980s or 1990s 
programme)  
Separate estimation for males -0.0472 -0.0039 
  (0.4486) (0.4888) 
Separate estimation for females -0.5787 -0.503 
  (0.4812) (0.5263) 
2000s programme -0.3203 -0.2076 
  (0.3653) (0.4511) 
Contextual controls 
Unemployment rate 0.2167*** 0.1947** 
  (0.0790) (0.0836) 
Number of observations 93 86 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1777 0.1821 
Akaike information criterion 180.4334 171.6131 
The table displays the estimated coefficients of ordererd probit models. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. "Preferred" reproduces the results from column (5) in 
Table 4. “Variation” tightens the definition of ALMP and the short run, eliminating 6 stud-
ies. "Other programmes" includes aggregate ALMP effects and combined programmes. 




Table A.3: Estimation results with clustered standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ALMP type (baseline: training)           
Wage subsidy 0.5732 0.6987* 1.0664*** 1.0561** 1.1301*** 0.9855** 
  (0.3832) (0.3905) (0.4109) (0.4441) (0.4156) (0.4580) 
Public works -0.5024* -0.4879 -0.1016 -0.1287 -0.2983 -0.1835 
  (0.2672) (0.3032) (0.2662) (0.3658) (0.3835) (0.3480) 
Services/sanctions 0.5002 0.4474 0.342 0.2952 0.2386 0.2475 
  (0.3823) (0.3381) (0.3608) (0.4006) (0.3973) (0.4307) 
Other programmes -0.5985* -0.6727* -0.5925 -0.6039 -0.9004** -0.7541* 
  (0.3454) (0.3880) (0.3701) (0.3780) (0.3630) (0.4337) 





-0.1694 -0.1524 -0.1252 0.5544 -0.1132 
  
 
(0.6052) (0.6494) (0.4951) (0.5220) (0.5019) 
Other method 
 
-0.3006 0.0912 0.1477 0.2542 0.1718 
  
 
(0.4608) (0.4575) (0.4055) (0.4936) (0.4028) 
Published paper 
 
0.6123 0.7224* 0.7099* 0.9968** 0.6462 
  
 
(0.4127) (0.4282) (0.3809) (0.4033) (0.3972) 




-0.0546 -0.0768 0.0452 -0.0954 
  
  
(0.4215) (0.4801) (0.5252) (0.4634) 
Short programme (up to 4 months) 
 
0.8051** 0.7990** 0.7728** 0.7464* 
  
  
(0.3512) (0.3653) (0.3812) (0.3948) 
Sample characteristics (baseline: pooled estimation for men and women, 1980s or 1990s programme)  
Separate estimation for males 
  
0.2034 -0.0472 0.2282 
  
   
(0.4847) (0.4730) (0.5173) 
Separate estimation for females 
  
-0.258 -0.5787 -0.244 
  
   
(0.5125) (0.5277) (0.5316) 
2000s programme 
   
0.1314 -0.3203 0.1842 
  
   
(0.4723) (0.4942) (0.4561) 
Contextual controls  
   
  
Unemployment rate 
    
0.2167***   
  
    
(0.0783)   
GDP growth rate 
     
0.0615 
  
     
(0.1226) 
Number of observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0708 0.0925 0.1217 0.1344 0.1777 0.1364 
Akaike information crite-
rion 181.9881 184.0131 182.6708 186.3419 180.4334 187.9807 
The table displays estimated coefficients of ordered probit models. Standard errors (clustered by 
study) in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 for significantly positive 
estimates, 0 for insignificant and -1 for significantly negative estimates. Unemployment and GDP 
growth rates are annual rates in % for the year the evaluated programme started. "Other countries" 




Table A.4: Sensitivity analysis for the estimation with clustered standard errors 
  Preferred Variation 
ALMP type (baseline: training)   
Wage subsidy 1.1301*** 1.2955*** 
  (0.4156) (0.4753) 
Public works -0.2983 -0.2629 
  (0.3835) (0.3911) 
Services/sanctions 0.2386 0.2203 
  (0.3973) (0.4005) 
Other programmes -0.9004** -1.0741*** 
  (0.3630) (0.3666) 
Study characteristics (baseline: matching, working paper) 
 
  
Duration analysis 0.5544 0.5938 
  (0.5220) (0.5652) 
Other method 0.2542 0.405 
  (0.4936) (0.5084) 
Published paper 0.9968** 0.8905** 
  (0.4033) (0.4255) 
Programme characteristics (baseline: regular ALMP, duration unknown or greater than four 
months) 
Migrant-specific programme 0.0452 0.1917 
  (0.5252) (0.5592) 
Short programme (up to 4 months) 0.7728** 0.7713** 
  (0.3812) (0.3604) 
Sample characteristics (baseline: pooled estimation for men and women, 1980s or 1990s pro-
gramme)  
Separate estimation for males -0.0472 -0.0039 
  (0.4730) (0.5862) 
Separate estimation for females -0.5787 -0.503 
  (0.5277) (0.6433) 
2000s programme -0.3203 -0.2076 
  (0.4942) (0.6543) 
Contextual controls 
Unemployment rate 0.2167*** 0.1947** 
  (0.0783) (0.0801) 
Number of observations 93 86 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1777 0.1821 
Akaike information criterion 180.4334 171.6131 
The table displays estimated coefficients of ordered probit models. Standard errors (clustered by 
study) in parentheses. "Preferred" reproduces results from column (5) in Table A.3. Variation 
tightens the definition of ALMP and the short run, eliminating 6 studies. "Other programmes" 
includes aggregate ALMP effects and combined programmes. *** denotes p < 0.01, ** denotes 
p < 0.05 and * denotes p < 0.1.  
 
